Abstract:
In recent years, many scholars have explored the degree of polarization between red and blue states (red states are those carried by Republicans at the presidential level, blue states are those carried by Democrats). Some claim that red and blue state citizens are deeply polarized, while others disagree, arguing that there are only limited differences between the two groups. All previous work on this topic, however, simply uses difference of means tests to determine when these two groups are polarized. We show that this test alone cannot determine whether states are actually polarized. We remedy this shortcoming by introducing a new measure based on the degree of issue position overlap between red and blue state citizens. Our findings demonstrate that there is only limited polarization-and a good deal of common ground-between red states and blue states. We discuss the implications of our work both for the study of polarization itself and for the broader study of American politics.
Conventional wisdom suggests that ordinary Americans are deeply divided. Red state citizens (states carried by Republicans at the Presidential level) are "ignorant racist fascist knuckle-dragging NASCAR-obsessed cousin-marrying road-kill-eating tobacco-juicedribbling gun-fondling religious fanatic rednecks," while their blue state counterparts are "godless unpatriotic pierced-nose Volvo-driving France-loving left-wing Communist latte-sucking tofu-chomping holistic-wacko neurotic vegan weenie perverts" (Barry 2004 ). According to such wisdom, most liberal, blue state coast dwellers, and conservative, red state heartland Americans look at each other as if they were from "separate planets," to quote Bush re-election chair Matthew Dowd (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005, 6) .
While the popular press largely accepts and encourages this characterization of the mass public, the scholarly literature is much more divided on this point. Some scholars argue that this popular view is deeply flawed, as red state and blue state citizens look quite similar along a variety of dimensions-the mass public remains moderate and centrist today, much as it was a generation ago (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005) .
Instead of a two well-defined factions, the public is better characterized by a set of complex, overlapping positions. Others vigorously challenge this conclusion, noting that there are often sizable differences of opinion between red and blue states, especially when comparing red-state Republicans to blue-state Democrats (Kohut et al. 2000; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009) . As Abramowitz and Saunders (2005) put it, "[r]ed state voters and blue state voters differ fairly dramatically in their social characteristics and political beliefs." (19) . If this view is correct, the mass public is deeply polarized into two non-overlapping camps, with red and blue state residents holding fundamentally different views on the issues.
Despite their different substantive conclusions, most scholars in this debate employ the same basic empirical strategy: they use a difference of means test to determine whether the two groups are polarized. If the mean opinion in red states is statistically distinguishable from the mean opinion in blue states, then they are polarized. In this paper, we show that this approach often leads researchers astray, indicating there is polarization when in fact red and blue state residents are more similar than different.
Instead, we show that scholars need to look at the entire distribution of opinion in red and blue states. Looking at the entire distribution of opinion allows us to assess the degree of overlap in the distribution of red and blue state issue preferences. That is, how much "common ground" is there between red and blue state voters? Even when average opinion in red states is significantly more conservative (i.e., where a difference of means test suggests red and blue states are polarized), red and blue state citizens often hold very similar issue positions. A difference of means test is not sufficient to draw any firm conclusions about polarization.
Our results have important implications for future discussion of opinion polarization.
It may be correct to talk about a polarization of choices available to the electorate, but it is misleading to discuss a polarization of beliefs in the presence of so much ideological overlap between the two camps. This preference heterogeneity also has important electoral consequences. While many factors contribute to any particular election, it helps to explain how seeming anomalies like Scott Brown, Arnold Schwarzenegger, or Kathleen Sebelius can win election (and re-election) in states where their party lags behind at the presidential level.
Polarization Beyond the Mean
When we refer to polarization, we mean that there is "a movement from the center toward the extremes"-a polarized citizenry has fewer moderates and more extremists (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008, 557 ; see also Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Hetherington 2009; Levendusky 2009 While some scholars move beyond difference of means tests in ways that help to consider heterogeneity, more remains to be done. Gelman (2008) , for example, considers differences between sub-groups in the population (by income etc.), which recognizes that heterogeneity exists and it matters (see also Baldassari and Gelman 2008) . On this basis of this type of analysis, Gelman concludes that "[citizens] don't seem to be narrowing into extremely coherent ideologies" (Gelman 2008, 129) , reflecting that the degree of heterogeneity in virtually all groups is likely to be significant even in recent elections.
Their analysis stops short, however, of specifying a way to quantify this heterogeneity.
Our analysis below builds on these earlier efforts, but makes a unique contribution to the literature by offering a measure of this second component of polarization, preference heterogeneity.
Measuring Preferences in Red and Blue States
To measure polarization, we need to first measure citizens' preferences, and determine their dimensionality. The dimensionality question is important because citizens may be more or less polarized on different dimensions, and mixing items across dimensions might yield misleading results. We measure citizens' preferences using recent survey data, in particular the common content module of the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, better known as the CCES (Ansolabehere, 2006) . To understand the dimensionality of these preferences, we factor analyzed the universe of issue preference items contained in the CCES; the results appear in table 1.
[Insert table 1 about here]
Looking at the output in table 1, the first dimension is dominated by the economic items about taxation and redistribution, along with the items about the Iraq War, affirmative action, and immigration; we therefore term this the "economic plus" dimension. While explaining why these items load together is beyond the scope of our paper, we can offer some tentative speculation. Arguably immigration and affirmative action are economic issues, with responses being driven at least in part by economic concerns (about how to divide the societal pie with disadvantaged groups), though perhaps with more items they would load more heavily on a separate "racial" dimension.
The Iraq-economy linkage reflects two deeper patterns in the data. First, in 2006, asking someone about the Iraq War was akin to asking them their partisanship given the deep divisions between the parties over that issue and Bush's handling of the conflict (Jacobson 2007) . Second, economic items relate strongly (relative to other domains) to partisanship (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006) . The Iraq-economy linkage here reflects these underlying patterns (Iraq attitudes are related to party, party is related to economic attitudes, so Iraq attitudes are related to economic attitudes). That said, readers made uncomfortable by the correlation between economic and (ostensibly) non-economic issues should be reassured by the fact that using only the "pure" economic items in table 1 (social security privatization, minimum wage, capital gains tax cut, and the taxes vs.
spending items) to define this factor would not change our substantive results in any meaningful way.
The second dimension, in contrast, focuses on social issues such as abortion and gay marriage. The only issue that loads clearly onto the third dimension is respondent's support or opposition for the CAFTA trade legislation. In what follows, we focus on the first two dimensions for both practical and theoretical reasons. First, from a practical standpoint, with only one item, our ability to say anything meaningful is extremely limited. To examine attitudes toward trade in more depth, we would need a richer battery of trade-related items, and so we save this task for future work. Further, from a theoretical perspective, a good deal of literature on the mass public's preferences suggests that citizen's attitudes primarily fall into economic and social domains, and as such, focusing on these dimensions puts us squarely within a longer tradition in American politics (Shafer and Claggett 1995; Layman and Carsey 2002 Second, we use the overlap coefficient, a measure used in statistics and economics to calculate the degree of commonality between two distributions (the original measure dates to Weitzman 1970) . The idea is simple: the overlap coefficient represents "the common area under two probability densities" (Schmid and Schmidt 2006, 1583) , or more simply, the area where the two probability distributions overlap. Figure 2 gives a graphical depiction of this concept.
[Insert figure 2 about here]
The shaded area in the graph depicts the region of overlap in this example. As figure 2 suggests, in this example, there is considerable overlap. To quantify exactly how much overlap there is, we can use the formula , where f() and g() are probability densities (here, the densities of issue preferences in red and blue states).
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While the formula is complicated, the measure itself is straightforward: overlap ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values representing higher degrees of overlap (that is, more area in common between two densities). In this case, the overlap coefficient is approximately 50 percent, fitting with our graphical representation in figure 2: while there is considerable common ground, there is also some area distinct to each of the two 6 In the results reported below, use the nonparametric version of the overlap coefficient suggested by Schmid and Schmidt (2006) .
This gives us an easy to understand measure of the degree of "common ground" shared by red and blue states.
Third, we also compare randomly chosen red and blue state citizens and ask how likely it is that the blue state citizen is more liberal. If red and blue states are highly polarized with little overlap between then, then with probability approaching 1, any blue state citizen should be more liberal than their red state counterpart. However, if red and blue states are less polarized and have more ideological overlap between them, then the probability should be significantly less than 1 and closer to 0.50, reflecting the heterogeneity within red and blue states.
One drawback to these measures (unlike a simple difference of means test) is that they lack a clear brightline standard: if the measure exceeds a given metric, then states are polarized, and if it does not, then they are not. While this is a drawback, it will not be a particularly serious one here, as all of our analysis points squarely in one direction.
Further, we would argue that this reflects the reality of a concept like polarization. There is no simple "polarized/not" dichotomy, but rather states are more or less polarized. A more subtle and continuous measure (like the one we use here) helps to reflect that fact.
The Role of Heterogeneity in the Polarization Debate
We begin by simply comparing the distribution of opinion in red and blue states to examine to examine the degree of overlap between states visually. While this is a crude test, it is an important step that offers an easy metric for assessing the commonality between states-readers can simply compare the graphs themselves and consider the degree of overlap: is it extensive or minimal? While we formalize this later using the quantitative metrics we described above, this interocular test conveys the same substantive information in an easy to understand format.
Consider first all red and blue states together (so pooling all blue state respondents into one "state," and likewise for red state residents); we use 2004
Presidential election returns to define red and blue states. Figure 3 plots the distribution of respondents' issue preferences in both red and blue states.
[Insert figure 3 about here]
Looking at figure 3, one is immediately drawn to the fact that there is quite a large degree of overlap, especially on the social issues dimension. If we were to just use the difference-of-means test to examine polarization, we could easily reject the null hypothesis of no difference on both dimensions. But simply looking at figure 3, one would much more hesitant to conclude that red and blue state citizens were deeply polarized: if anything, one would be inclined to note the striking amount of overlap and common ground they share. Rather than polarization, the over-riding message of figure 3 is moderation.
To consider the degree of polarization more formally, we can calculate the two formal metrics we discussed earlier. Looking at the overlap criterion, we find that there is 92 percent overlap on both dimensions of issue preferences. Likewise, we can also calculate the probability a randomly selected blue state citizen is more liberal than a randomly selected red state citizen. Examining all red and blue states, the probability that the blue state citizen is more liberal is 0.54 on the first (economics plus) dimension and 0.49 on the second (social issues) dimension. That is, while blue state citizens are on average more liberal, they are not uniformly more so-indeed, it is basically a coin flip to determine which respondent (the red state or the blue state resident) is more liberal. This conclusion holds even when eliminating so-called "purple states" that went for either party by only a few points: the probability that a blue-state citizen drawn at random is more liberal is 0.55 on the first dimension and 0.51 on the second dimension. 7 In short, both metrics show a great deal of commonality between red and blue states, with much more common ground than division between the two groups.
But perhaps pooling across all red and blue state stacks the deck in our favor, because of the large sample size and the heterogeneity across states. To guard against this possibility, we recalculated the overlap statistic for every possible pair of red and blue states (that is, take every red state, pair it individually with every blue state, and calculate the overlap for each pair of states), and then plot the resulting distribution of overlap statistics. Figure 4 gives the results for both the economics plus and the social issues dimensions.
[Insert figure 4 about here]
On both dimensions, the amount of overlap is much closer to 1 than to 0 (that is, closer to complete overlap than to no overlap "fairly dramatic" differences in opinion anywhere, partisan subgroups are the most logical places to start-"drilling down" to a lower level of aggregation might yield a different picture of mass polarization. Figure 6 gives a revised version of figure 3, except we compare red state Republicans to blue state Democrats.
[Insert figure 6 about here] Figure 6 is striking relative to the earlier graphs. At first glance, particularly with respect to figure 3, one notices that there is now quite a bit of separation on both dimensions, Some people might claim that figure 6 shows strong evidence of polarization. This is not an unreasonable claim at some level, given the sharp mean differences between these two groups and the more modest levels of overlap. But it is important to note that if any polarization exists here, it is partisan polarization (aka sorting), rather than geographic polarization (on the distinction, see Levendusky 2009, chapter 1 The differences we find here reflect the fact that the partisans are increasingly better sorted into liberal and conservative camps, with Democrats on the left and Republicans on the right (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Levendusky 2009 ). The patterns in figure 6 show us that Democrats and Republicans take different positions, not that red states and blue state residents as a whole do. This is partisan polarization, not geographic polarization.
District-Level Heterogeneity
We focus primarily on red and blue states in large part because that is the focus of the previous literature. But maybe even partisan sub-groups within states are too large, and we should examine the data at an even finer level of aggregation: the congressional district level. We can ask if the same conclusions about red and blue states hold up when we consider red and blue districts. [Insert figure 7 about here] Figure 7 shows that there is a great deal of overlap even between "red" and "blue" districts, though one could easily differentiate the average respondent in red and blue districts. The overlap statistics here are broadly similar to red and blue states: the overlap percentages are 86 percent and 89 percent. Even at the district level, there is more similarity than difference in red and blue America.
But of course some (or perhaps most) of this heterogeneity comes from moderate districts. Perhaps if we dig deep enough, we can find more extreme districts with less overlap. We take two districts seen in the popular press as extreme: CA-8 (Nancy 
Conclusions
This paper takes another look at the red-state/blue-state debate, and argues that scholars' empirical tests have missed an important dimension to that conflict: the degree of heterogeneity and overlap in citizens' preferences. Prior work tests for polarization between red and blue states (and partisan sub-groups in those locales) by simply looking at difference of means tests. We argue that this is useful, but too limited-difference of means tests cannot fully capture the degree of heterogeneity between red and blue states.
We develop a new measure of overlap between red and blue states that allows us to directly comment on the degree of overlap between red and blue states.
A different picture of polarization emerges when we consider the degree of heterogeneity within states. While there are important differences between states (and partisan sub-groups within states), there is also a great deal of common ground. While red state citizens may be more conservative than their blue state counterparts, they both contain a good deal of moderates, and conservatives (liberals) do make their home in blue (red) states, a finding that survives even looking at partisan subgroups or Congressional districts. Further, to the extent that we find evidence of polarization, it is evidence of partisan polarization (aka sorting-the tendency of Democrats and Republicans to sort themselves into the correct ideological camp), rather than geographic polarization.
Moving beyond just looking at the mean opinion in states gives a richer and more 
Appendix: CCES Sampling Methodology and Questions Used
The 2006 The common content module of the CCES (the portion we use for our analyses)
consists of 36,421 respondents. Given that our analysis takes place at the state level, the within-state sample sizes are more directly relevant for our analysis. Table A1 gives sample sizes by state.
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